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Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4859
Lack of access to electricity is one of the major 
impediments to growth and development of the rural 
economies in developing countries. That is why access 
to modern energy, in particular to electricity, has been 
one of the priority themes of the World Bank and other 
development organizations. Using a cross-sectional 
survey conducted in 2005 of some 20,000 households in 
rural Bangladesh, this paper studies the welfare impacts 
of households’ grid connectivity. Based on rigorous 
econometric estimation techniques, this study finds 
that grid electrification has significant positive impacts 
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on households’ income, expenditure, and educational 
outcomes. For example, the gain in total income due to 
electrification can be as much as 30 percent and as low as 
9 percent. Benefits go up steadily as household exposure 
to grid electrification (measured by duration) increases 
and eventually reach a plateau. This paper also finds that 
rich households benefit more from electrification than 
poor households. Finally, estimates also show that income 
benefits of electrification on an average exceed cost by a 
wide margin.  
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1.  Introduction 
It is universally accepted that electrification enhances quality of life at household level and 
stimulates economy at a broader level. The immediate benefit of electrification comes 
through improved lighting, which promotes extended hours of study and in turn contributes 
to better educational achievements.  Lighting can also benefit other household activities, 
such as sewing by women, social gatherings after dark, and so on.   Electric gadgets such as 
radios and television improve the access to information by rural households and can provide 
entertainment to family members.  In addition, household’s economic activities both inside 
and outside the home benefit a lot from electricity. For example, crop productivity can be 
increased by the application of electric irrigation pumps, businesses can be operated longer 
hours in the evening, electric tools and machinery can impart efficiency and productivity to 
industrial enterprises, and so on. The benefits of electricity have been discussed in a large 
body of literature (Unnayan Shamannay and Development Design Consultants Ltd. 1996; 
Barkat et al 2002; Cabraal and Barnes 2006; Barnes, Peskin and Fitzgerald 2003; Kulkarni 
and Barnes 2004; Khandker 1996; Filmer and Pritchett 1998; Roddis 2000; World Bank 
2002; Agarwal 2005).  
Rural electrification projects are often justified because they are intended to promote 
household welfare by providing a better quality of life or more productivity.  This view − 
along with the significance of other sources of modern energy − has resulted in modern 
energy being recognized as essential to fulfilling the Millennium Development Goals (United 
Nations 2005). Over the years there have been various studies that have examined the 
impact of rural electrification on development in Bangladesh (Barakat and et al 2002; Halim 
2005; BETS-BUP 2006; Unnayan Shamannay and Development Design Consultants Ltd. 
1996). Even though these studies have found significant benefits of electrification, most of 
them have simply showed the correlation between rural electrification and development.  
For example, these studies have examined impacts on income.  However, examining impacts 
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 of electrification on income are problematic because it is well documented that people with 
lower income either put off adopting electricity once it becomes available, or may not have 
the money to pay for the connection fees and other costs of electricity.  That is, it is not clear 
what causes what.  In general, the common problem with an impact assessment study is the 
failure to address causality issues, such as endogeneity of program placement and household 
participation in an electrification development project. This study uses econometric 
techniques to determine the net effects of rural electrification, after controlling for 
endogeneity. More specifically, this study estimates benefits of rural electrification of the 
REB project on various household and individual welfare outcomes using a 2005 survey of 
rural households.     
This paper is organized as follows.  An overview of rural electrification in 
Bangladesh is given in Section 2.  This section examines the institutional development and 
role of the Rural Electrification Board (REB) in providing electricity to rural customers.  
Since late 1970s the REB has been promoting electricity in rural areas throughout the 
country.  In section 3, the survey methodology and data used for of this study are described. 
This section also provides some basic information on electricity use patterns in rural areas.  
In Section 4, we explore the influence of both household and village characteristics on 
household demand for electricity.   The causality issues in estimation of electrification 
impacts are addressed in Section 5 using two techniques, which are Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM) and instrumental variable (IV) regression. Both methods are commonly 
used to address the complicated causality issues that are inherent in impact assessment 
exercises. Section 5 also reports findings based on these techniques. The impact of having 
electricity is taken one step further in Section 6 by looking at the benefits of long-term 
exposure to electricity, and examining whether the benefits tend to decline over time.   
Section 7 explores if the distribution of the benefits of electricity vary among rich and poor 
households.  Finally, in the last section we conclude the paper with the policy implications of 
the study.                
 
2.  Rural electrification in Bangladesh: The contribution of REB   
After the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the first major initiative to extend grid 
electricity in rural areas was taken in 1975 under a scheme called ‘Total Electrification 
Programme’. This program looked beyond grid connectivity towards development of the 
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 basic distribution facilities for effective delivery of power to rural areas by 1978. At around 
the same time, establishing an institutional structure was considered, which would develop 
the technical, economic, financial and social analysis, and organizational requirements for a 
rural electrification project in Bangladesh. Then at the request of the Bangladesh 
Government Rural Electrification Project Committee, a decision was taken for the 
establishment of a new national agency under the Power Ministry to develop and administer 
a rural electrification program. Accordingly, Rural Electrification Board (REB) was 
established on 29 October, 1977 and started functioning on 1 January, 1978 with following 
basic objectives: 
 
 Ensure consumer participation in policy-making. 
 Provide reliable, sustainable and affordable electricity to rural people. 
 Help improve the economic condition of rural people by providing electricity for 
agriculture and small industries. 
 Help improve the living condition of rural people. 
 Expand electrification to entire rural Bangladesh. 
 
The REB program operates through locally organized rural electric associations called 
Palli Bidyut Samity (PBS). The concept of PBS is based on the model of Rural Electric 
Cooperatives in USA, which operates with cooperatives and ownership of consumers. A 
PBS is an autonomous organization registered with REB, and it owns, operates and manages 
a rural distribution system within its area of jurisdiction. Its members are its consumers, who 
participate in its policy-making through elected representatives in its governing body. REB’s 
role is to provide PBS with assistance in initial organizational activities, training, operational 
and management activities, procurement of funds, and providing liaison between PBS and 
the bulk power suppliers like Bangladesh Power Development Board (PDB), Dhaka Electric 
Supply Authority (DESA), and other concerned Government and Non-Government 
agencies. The area coverage of one PBS is usually 5-10 thanas (sub-districts) with a 
geographic expanse of 600-700 sq. miles.   
The first PBS was established in 1980 to operate in Dhaka, and as of 2007 a total of 
70 PBSs are working in some 46,000 villages in 61 districts and serving more than 7 million 
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 rural customers all over Bangladesh (REB 2007). Since the inception of REB, rural 
electrification has grown significantly – starting from less than 10 percent connectivity in 
1977, about 61 percent villages have received electricity by 2007.2 Under REB’s program, 
about 800,000 new rural customers get electricity every year, which is phenomenal for a poor 
country like Bangladesh. The REB consumers are mostly domestic users of electricity (85 
percent), although industrial and commercial customers are also served, including those 
needing connection for irrigation pumps. REB plans to cover 75,000 villages of Bangladesh 
by the year 2020.3 A detailed breakdown of rural electrification rates by region is given later 
when we discuss the sample data.  
The rural electrification program of REB is often viewed as one of the most 
successful government programs in Bangladesh. A 2004 study of electricity distribution and 
transmission in Bangladesh found that system loss in 2000 for REB was much lower (16 
percent) than that for other major electricity distribution bodies – PDB (28 percent), DESA 
(30 percent) and DESCO (33 percent) (Alam and others 2004).4  This is because the usual 
distributional problems that plague other Bangladeshi distributors (theft, non-payment of bill 
by influential subscribers, illegal connection, over-billing, etc.) are almost nonexistent in the 
operation of REB. REB also has an almost perfect bill collection record - over 95 percent of 
the REB customers pay their bills. REB has improved further since 2000, and reported a 13 
percent system loss during 2005-2006 (REB 2007), which compares quite favorably to the 
system loss in other South Asian countries. The success of REB is due mostly to its 
autonomy, minimal bureaucracy, strong culture of integrity, donor support and trust, and 
strong and independent leadership (USAID 2006).  
The political appeal of the REB and other worldwide rural electrification programs is 
that many of the benefits for the countries seem obvious. Because of the electric lighting, 
household members can engage themselves in useful and productive activities in a way that 
is not possible or at least very difficult in households without electricity. For example, 
students can study more easily and comfortably after the dark, adults can postpone chores 
until the evening, access mass media through TV and radio, and so on and so forth. Besides 
                                                 
2 Our data, which were collected in 2005, show a 58 percent connectivity at village level in Bangladesh. 
3 According 1991 census, total number of villages in Bangladesh is about 86,000. The 11,000 villages that are 
not included in REB’s plan are covered by PDB, DESA and other distributors.   
4 System loss is the difference between the quantity produced (generated) and the actual quantity sold, and is 
expressed as a percentage of the quantity produced. It is a widely accepted measure of the efficiency of the 
distribution system.     
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 households, business and retail enterprises with electricity can continue operating and 
keeping their stores open during the evening.  It is the purpose of this paper to rigorously 
examine whether these assumed program benefits are real or not. 
 
3.  Research methods and survey data 
This study is based on a survey initiated by REB with the financing from the World Bank in 
2004. The survey was titled “The Socio-Economic Monitoring and Impact Evaluation of 
Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy Programme in Bangladesh.”  The purpose of 
the survey was to develop practical methods and guidelines to monitor, and evaluate rural 
electrification programs of REB.  The task involved undertaking a large baseline survey to 
assess the socioeconomic impacts of the rural electrification program of REB and to develop 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies to assess benefits of rural electrification.  In order 
to carry out the monitoring and evaluation work, the study also aimed to enhance the 
internal capacity of REB and its affiliated PBSs.  The actual survey was carried out in 2005 
by Bangladesh Engineering and Technological Services Ltd. (BETS) and Bangladesh 
Unnayan Parishad (BUP).  
The survey administered detailed questionnaires for domestic, commercial, industrial 
and irrigation units with and without electricity. Domestic questionnaires included 
information on household characteristics, consumption, income, energy use pattern and 
appliances.  The energy questions in the survey covered electricity use, grid connection and 
quality of service, use of solar home systems, and also household perception about the 
quality of services. There were also qualitative questions on women’s empowerment and 
general health awareness. Questions in commercial enterprises and industry survey involved 
the nature of the businesses including their operation, cost and revenue, and consumption of 
various types of energy including electricity. For the irrigation survey there were questions 
on pumps, usage patterns, cost of operation, crop production and energy consumption. All 
this information is useful to determine the energy use pattern of both domestic and non-
domestic units and to assess impacts of rural electrification.  However, in this study we 
concentrate solely on the impacts of household use of electricity.   
The survey covers a wide geographical area covering all six divisional regions of 
Bangladesh that are under the operation of REB. In fact 45 out of a total of 70 PBSs 
operating in Bangladesh were covered by the survey. A stratified random sample was drawn 
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 according to their electrification status.  Thus, the sample contains roughly 50-50 split 
between those with and without electricity.   The domestic, commercial, industrial and 
irrigation samples were selected based on actual distribution within rural Bangladesh – that is 
85 percent domestic, 11 percent commercial, 2.5 percent irrigation, and 1.5 percent industrial 
samples were selected. As for the control group, samples were drawn in equal proportion 
from three types of areas: villages with electricity, project villages without electricity (these 
villages were expected to get electricity during the ongoing project period), and non-project 
villages without electricity (these villages were not expected to get electricity during the 
ongoing project period). In addition, a small number of households (1,000) were purposely 
selected in the sample areas that own solar home system (SHS). The final collected sample 
shown in Table 1, and as usually the case it varied slightly from planned sample (see BETS-
BUP 2006 for more detailed description).  
Electrification status by village and household in all six regions, as found in the data, 
is reported in Table 2.5 While Sylhet region has the highest proportion of villages that have 
electricity (63.9 percent), proportion of households in electrified villages is highest in 
Chittagong region (68.2 percent). Chittagong region overall has also the highest proportion 
of households with electricity (40.3 percent). Barisal region on the other hand has the lowest 
household electrification rate (23.1 percent). Overall, about 57 percent of Bangladeshi 
villages have electricity, 58.2 percent of households in those electrified villages have 
electricity, and 33.1 percent rural households in whole Bangladesh have electricity.6 
We begin by comparing cases with and without electricity both at village and 
household-level.   The main variables of interest for this study are consumption expenditure 
and income at household level, and completed schooling years and study hours at individual 
level.  Compared to the households in villages without electricity, those in villages with 
electricity have significantly better schooling outcomes (Table 3).   However, the differences 
in economic outcomes are not consistent. The village level electricity benefits may also 
include direct benefits to households and (indirect) spillover benefits, such as street lighting 
                                                 
5 During data cleaning 16 households were dropped, keeping 20,900 households for analysis. Since electricity 
users are overdrawn in the sample, all figures and estimations used in this paper are weighted using actual PBS-
level distributions of users and nonusers.  
6 This figure is close to the finding of a recent study based on a survey of rural households conducted in 2004 
(World Bank 2008).  
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 available to all households. 7  This stresses the need for a close look at the complicated causal 
factors involved in examining development impacts.   
The direct benefits of electrification are those that go directly to the households who 
have electricity. For households without electricity but located in villages with grid service, 
there is a possibility of indirect benefits as just mentioned.  Finally, there are households in 
villages without electricity service.  Households with electricity have decidedly better levels 
of income, expenditures, and education than those without electricity (Table 4).  However, 
households without electricity in villages with electricity are worse off than those in villages 
without electricity.  This is not surprising, because households in villages without electricity 
are expected to be a mix of all socioeconomic classes, but those without electricity in villages 
with grid service tend to be among the poorest in the community (a bulk of these 
households cannot afford connection or other costs). Overall, households with electricity are 
generally better off than those without electricity.   
Next we examine if the differences in household welfares by electrification are 
statistically significant. Table 5 reports the differences in household income, expenditure and 
education by their electrification status.  The households with electricity are compared to 
households without electricity in both villages with and without electricity.  The differences 
in income and expenditure levels are expressed in log forms. As expected, households with 
electricity have higher levels of benefits compared to either of the two other groups and 
these differences are significant.  The question can be asked whether this means that having 
electricity in a household conclusively contributes to better welfare.  At this point it is not 
possible to make such an assertion because we have not yet explored the factors that may 
have contributed to such differences in welfares. Furthermore, we know that grid electricity 
service is extended first to more developed and densely populated regions (for revenue 
maximization), and it is only later that they reach more remote and poorer areas.  Therefore, 
assessing the causal impacts requires an examination of the underlying reasons for electricity 
program placement and program participation.   
                                                 
7 Spillover benefits are possible in other ways too. For example, electrification may generate village-wide 
economic activities and growth which the nonusers of electricity, besides the users, can benefit from.  
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4.  Household characteristics and electricity adoption   
The first use of electricity in rural areas is household lighting.  The reason is that electric light 
is much brighter than that provided by kerosene lamps, and the price per unit of light can be 
hundreds of time cheaper.  Because of frequent power outages, people do not discard their 
kerosene lamps after they have grid connection, but relegate it to a standby energy source.  
Over time households diversify their electricity consumption by acquiring different electric 
appliances such television, radio, electric fans, refrigerator, electric pumps (for expanding 
crop production) and other tools and machinery (for home-based or outside enterprises). 
According to an earlier analysis of this survey data, the major uses of electricity in rural 
Bangladesh are reported to be for children’s education (83 percent), followed by 
entertainment (44 percent), information access (22 percent), and home-based businesses (9 
percent) (BETS-BUP 2006).  
Given these benefits, it is important to examine what determines electricity adoption 
at the household level.   To accomplish this, we look at a number of factors at the household 
and village level, including household’s physical endowments (such as land) and human 
capital (such as adults’ education), price of different fuels in the village and others.  Since 
household electrification can only be observed in villages that have electricity, the issue of 
sample selection needs to be addressed in estimating household’s access to electricity.8 
Under this condition, instead of a simple probit model, a maximum likelihood probit model 
with sample selection is implemented using a two-stage procedure that involves a latent 
equation and a selection equation (Van de Ven and Van Pragg 1981). The selection equation 
that determines village electrification is of following form: 
                                                
 
j
v
j
vv
j εZβαV ++=    (1) 
 
And household electrification (latent equation) is given by, 
 
ij
e
j
e
ij
ee
ij εUγXβαE +++=   (2) 
 
8 Of course village electrification is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for household electrification, 
as there are many households without grid connection in electrified villages.  
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where,  is a vector of household level characteristics (for example, head’s age, gender, 
household landholding, etc.);  and  are vectors of village characteristics where  
contains at least one variable that is not in ; and are unobserved random errors; 
and , and  are parameters to be determined. Here, household electrification is 
observed ( ) only if village electrification is observed (
ijX
e
E
jU jZ jZ
jU
e
ijε vjε
 e
1ij 1jV ), and error terms satisfy 
the following conditions:  
 
)1,0(~ Neij  
)1,0(~ Nvj  
 ),( vjeijcorr  
 
When 0 , a simple probit estimation applied to equation (2) gives biased results, but a 
maximum likelihood probit model gives consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates of 
household electrification. We use regional dummies and village infrastructure variables in the 
selection equation (in ), but not in . The idea behind this formulation is, once village 
electrification is determined by regional and community characteristics, it is mostly the 
household characteristics that will determine household’s grid connectivity.    
jZ jU
 The summary statistics of dependent and explanatory variables used in the 
electrification demand and subsequent impact equations are presented in Table 6.   The table 
shows that households with electricity are clearly better off than those without electricity in 
terms of general characteristics.9 For example, households with electricity have more land 
asset and more educated adult members than their counterpart households without 
electricity. These variables are used to predict whether or not a household adopts electricity. 
Household landholding is included as a proxy for income to denote household’s welfare 
status because, unlike income, it does not change in the short term and therefore is not likely 
                                                 
9 An exception is household’s landholding. Our data show that within villages with electricity, average 
landholding of electrified households (118.22 decimals) is much more than that of non-electrified households 
(74.74 decimals). However, households in non-electrified villages have more land (average value of 150.50 
decimals) than the electrified households, causing the overall average landholding of non-electrified households 
to be higher than that of electrified households.  
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 to be changed due to the adoption of electricity. Results shown in Table 7 indicate the 
relationship between the household characteristics and the adoption of electricity.     
  In general, both the descriptive statistics in Table 6 and the impacts in Table 7 are 
very consistent.  Again, households with members having a better education, greater land 
assets, and better housing conditions are more likely to adopt electricity. Residents of brick 
houses are 68 percent more likely to have electricity than those living in inferior homes. At 
village level, higher firewood prices increase the likelihood of electricity adoption by village 
residents, while the prices of kerosene or diesel play no role. In summary, households with 
better physical and human endowments are more likely to have electricity than those without 
such endowments.   
 Estimation also shows that 0<ρ , meaning the unobserved factors that determine 
the program placement at the village level do not necessarily determine household’s access to 
electricity.  In other words, there are unobserved household factors relevant to household 
electrification which may be quite different from the productive potential of a village that 
attract investment in electricity at village level.   
 
5.  The impact of rural electrification    
The main difficulty in project impact evaluation is to find a counterfactual.  This means 
examining the scenario as to what would have happened to the households with electricity if 
they did not have electricity.  One way to deal with this counterfactual is to make electricity 
available in a randomized fashion and then observe how households similar in all 
characteristics except electricity compare with one another.   But randomization is very 
difficult to implement for most infrastructure projects (such as rural electrification) because 
of policy and economic reasons. In order to be financially viable, electricity providing entities 
generally follow a plan to reach more developed and densely populated communities first 
before moving the services out to more remote and less developed areas.   As a result, it is 
necessary to statistically create (or simulate) a counterfactual situation in order to compare 
similar households with and without electricity.   
There are two methods commonly used to deal with the counterfactual issue.  One is 
to identify close matches for household with and without electricity that are similar in most 
other ways.  Over a large sample such as the one available for our study, it is quite possible 
to match a large number of households.  The most widely used matching technique for this 
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 purpose is the propensity score matching (PSM). The second method estimates an outcome 
equation conditional on program participation.  The reasoning behind this approach is that 
some factors related to adoption of electricity may not be directly related to the outcome 
variables. For example, price of electricity can be a potential candidate for such factor, 
because it affects the adoption of electricity by a household but does not directly affect its 
income.  The method that uses this type of estimation is the instrumental variable (IV) 
method.  We will use both methods in assessing the impacts of household electrification.     
 
Propensity score matching (PSM) technique:  
As discussed earlier, a simple comparison of households with and without electricity just 
gives a snapshot of the outcomes without any consideration as to what causes them.  These 
households may vary fundamentally in initial characteristics and also their ability to access to 
electricity.  The calculated benefits may be due to the differences in household or village 
characteristics rather than in having electricity.   We address this problem in part by using a 
matching technique. At the heart of any matching technique lies the identification of a 
counterfactual, which identifies households with no intervention to compare with 
households with similar characteristics but with intervention.  Essentially this is a simulation 
of with and without scenarios. This technique involves first by matching households with 
and without electricity based on observed pre-intervention characteristics.  After this 
matching is done, this is possible to observe the difference of average outcome values 
between these two groups (just like the single difference method). Households that cannot 
be matched are discarded from this comparison process.  
Propensity score matching (PSM), is the most commonly used matching technique 
which goes further than directly matching observable characteristics. The PSM technique 
calculates for both treated (with electricity) and untreated (without electricity) samples, the 
probability of treatment or electrification as a function of household or village characteristics 
from a logit or probit model.  This probability of adopting electricity, calculated for 
households both with and without electricity,  is called propensity score.  The outcomes of 
treated units are then compared with those of untreated units. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
show that if treatment is random within cells defined by X , it is also random within cells 
defined by the values of the propensity score  Xp .  So, if the propensity score  is  iXp
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 known, the impact of the treatment (which they call Average effect of Treatment on the 
Treated or ATT) can be estimated as follows: 
 
    1|01  iii DYYE  
      )}(,1|{ 01 iiii XpDYYEE 
     1|)}(,0|{)}(,1|{ 01  iiiiiii DXpDYEXpDYEE     (3) 
 
where the outer expectation is over the distribution of ( 1|)( ii DXp ) and  and  are 
the outcomes in the two counterfactual situations of (respectively) treatment and no 
treatment.
iY1 iY0
10  
One disadvantage of PSM method is that matching process may discard a significant 
number of observations from the original sample non-randomly, making the working sample 
unrepresentative. We will discuss two alternative uses of propensity score that can take care 
of this problem. First, the estimated propensity score, instead of the actual treatment 
variable, can be added in an OLS regression of the outcome variable:  
 
ij
y
ijjij
y
j
y
ij
yy
ij PVXY      (4) 
 
where, is the welfare outcome of the i-th household of the j-th village,  and  are 
vectors of household and village characteristics as defined before,  is the propensity score 
(household’s probability of adopting electricity) which replaces the actual electrification 
variable indicating household’s access to electricity, , ,   are parameters to be 
estimated, 
ijY  ijX jV
ijP
yy y
  and   are unobserved determinants of household outcome at village- and 
household-level respectively, and  is an unobserved random error. This procedure can 
remove any omitted variable bias that would have resulted using a simple OLS regression 
(Ravallion 2005, Imbens 2004). A disadvantage of this method is it assumes a functional 
form which standard PSM technique does not. A second way is to use in the OLS regression 
of the outcome variable a weight variable constructed from the propensity score: the weight 
y
                                                 
10 More on PSM technique can be found in Becker and Ichino (2002). 
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 is defined as ijP/1  for treated households and )-1(/1 ijP  for control households.11 The 
resulting equation looks like: 
 
ij
y
ijjij
y
j
y
ij
yy
ij EVXY      (5) 
 
where,  is the actual treatment variable indicating household’s access to electricity and 
this equation is estimated using a weight variable calculated.  A study by Hirano, Imbens and 
Ridder (2003) shows that by using propensity score to calculate weight balances the 
covariates and results in fully efficient estimates. We implement all three approaches of 
propensity score for comparison and to check the robustness of the results.   
ijE
Implementations of the PSM technique show that rural electrification has a 
significant and generally positive impact on income, expenditures and education (Table 8).    
The figures in the second column show standard PSM estimates with Kernel matching.12  
The third column includes regression estimates in which the propensity score or likelihood 
of having electricity is used instead of the actual electrification status of the household in 
OLS outcome regression. In the last column shows a regression estimate that uses a weight 
derived from the propensity score, as defined before.  
The results show that, in almost all cases, reported impacts for economic outcomes 
are highest in standard PSM implementation and lowest in the first alternate implementation. 
For example, electrification impact on per capita expenditure is 15.4 percent in standard 
PSM, 6.0 percent in first alternative, and 9.2 percent in second alternative. Educational 
impacts are also highest in standard PSM, except for girls’ schooling years where impact in 
first alternative is the highest. Girls schooling years increase by 0.23 grade, 0.36 grade and 
0.12 grade due to electrification in standard PSM, first alternative and second alternative 
respectively. Overall, we see that different implementations of PSM are very consistent 
among themselves in the direction of impacts.  
 
                                                 
11 A variation of the formula for weight (without the square root sign) is also used. However we prefer the 
square-rooted version because it scales down the variation in weight.  
12 In Kernel matching, each unit (household in our case) in the treatment group is matched to a weighted 
average of all units (as opposed to fewer units used in some other matching) in the control group, with greater 
weight being given to units with scores that are closer.      
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 Instrumental variable (IV) technique:  
Although PSM technique controls for biases due to observed characteristics, it still cannot 
correct biases due to unobserved characteristics or endogeneity. For example, some people 
are more motivated than others, and this may cause them to be early adopters of electricity. 
The degree of this motivation or dynamism is not observable, but it can still bias estimates 
obtained through PSM technique.  The problem of endogeneity might also arise from 
criteria used for program placement and this is typically not a random process. For example, 
the REB does not just randomly select a village for electrification, but conducts feasibility 
studies before making a decision to extend electricity to villages. As a consequence, it is likely 
to select a village for electrification that is very different from the unselected villages. This 
section addresses the issue of such endogeneity bias and a possible estimation strategy to 
control for it.        
 Let us assume that outcome of a particular kind (such as consumption or income) 
measured by , conditional on the treatment of household electrification ( ), can be 
expressed by equation similar to equation 5, which is repeated here:  
ijY ijE
                    
ij
y
ijjij
y
j
y
ij
yy
ij EVXY      (5) 
 
where, , ,  and  have the same definition as mentioned before, , ,   are 
parameters to be estimated, 
ijY ijX jV ijE
y y y
  and   are unobserved determinants of household outcome 
at village- and household-level respectively, and  is an unobserved random error.   y
 If all variables are observable (that is,   and   are absent),  would determine, 
without bias, the impact of household electrification. In that case, we can use a reduced form 
ordinary least squared (OLS) regression to estimate . However, since 
y
y   and   are 
unobserved, the estimated impacts of electrification would be biased if household’s access to 
electricity is influenced by those unobserved variables. As a consequence, a household’s 
decision to have electricity may be correlated with the error term , giving rise to possible 
endogeneity.   
y
  One way to resolve the endogeneity bias is to use household fixed-effect regressions. 
But with cross-sectional data that is not possible. Another way to resolve the endogeneity is 
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 to use instrumental variables (IV) estimation. The idea is to first identify suitable instruments 
that can influence household’s access to electrification ( ) but not the error term ( ). In 
other words, instruments should not directly influence the outcome , but only through 
the intervention (access to electricity). Household’s access to electricity ( ) is predicted 
using instrumental variables in a probit regression, and then the predicted value of that 
access ( ), instead of actual , is used in the second stage outcome equation (5). This 
works because instrument variables break the correlation between the treatment and the 
error term, thereby eliminating the endogeneity bias.        
ijE
y
ijY
ijE
ijEˆ ijE
  Selecting appropriate instruments is crucial. One possible way of finding good 
instruments is to apply demand theory. According to demand theory, the prices of 
endogenous variables could be good candidates for instrumental variables if the market is 
competitive, and we also mentioned briefly the price of electricity as a potential instrument.  
However, the price of electricity is fixed and the demand for electricity is more conditioned 
by the availability of electricity rather than the price of electricity, and so electricity price 
cannot be used as an instrument. Instead, the presence of electricity in the village can be a 
possible instrumental variable. However, the presence of electricity in a village (or its 
allocation) is itself endogenous and can be determined by several factors including the 
general wellbeing of the village, which may also influence household welfare outcomes we 
are trying to estimate (for example, income). So we need more than village electrification – 
something which is exogenous to this whole process. We take a closer look at household’s 
decision making to connect, as village electrification by itself does not ensure the access of 
electricity by a household.  
After REB expands its electrification program to a village, a household has to make a 
conscious choice to adopt electricity.  The connection cost is probably the most significant 
factor influencing a household’s decision to adopt electricity. In Bangladesh, the process 
works as follows.  For households living within 100 feet of the electricity line or lines that 
run through a village, connection cost for obtaining electric service is highly subsidized and 
therefore low.  By contrast, the connection cost charged by the electric cooperatives for 
households beyond 100 feet from the line is much higher as they have to bear the full cost of 
connection.  For all practical purposes, we can say that households living within 100 feet of 
electric line have a choice in getting electricity, while those living farther or in villages 
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 without electricity do not. Thus, a household’s location within or beyond 100 feet of an 
electricity line can be used as an instrument, since it influences household’s grid electricity 
adoption but not directly their outcomes.  
REB prioritizes villages for grid electricity connection based on the potential revenue 
generated by market conditions. The revenue criteria require that each kilometer of line 
constructed generates roughly US$400 per month to cover the operating costs (Waddle 
2007). Once a village is so identified, REB selects a location to lay out the electric line and 
poles – a location with enough population to generate desired revenue. A densely populated 
location does not imply that the location is economically prosperous, particularly in 
Bangladesh.  The PBSs optimized the line placement on the basis of population density to 
enhance revenue.  So we contend that a household’s choice for grid electrification, which is 
determined by its location relative to the electric line, is fairly independent of the household’s 
income. Our data also finds very little correlation between the choice variable (determined 
by household’s proximity to electric line) and household’s welfare outcomes.13 So we use this 
choice variable (which is 1 if a household is in a village with electricity and either has 
adopted electricity or is located within 100 ft of electric line, and 0 otherwise)  for 
instrumentation in the IV estimation.            
We interact this choice variable (let us call it ) with  and  variables to get 
the set of household level instruments. The first stage equation now can be written as, 
ijC ijX jV
  
e
ijjij
e
ijij
e
ij
e
j
e
ij
ee
ij VCXCCVXE   )()(   (6) 
 
 Both PSM and IV methods have their own advantages and disadvantages. An IV 
method controls for both observed and unobserved characteristics, while PSM cannot 
control for unobserved characteristics. But unlike IV or any regression technique, PSM does 
not assume a functional form, which is certainly an advantage.  
Even with the compelling reasons for using IV estimation, it is a good idea to test 
whether an OLS or an IV approach is the more appropriate estimation technique with the 
data at hand. To examine this issue, the results from both OLS and IV approach are 
                                                 
13 Correlation between choice and household’s land, income or expenditure is less than 10 percent.   
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 presented in Table 9 along with results of an endogeneity test.14  The results of the Hausman 
test for endogeneity reject the null hypothesis in 5 out of 8 outcomes at 5 percent level, 
confirming that IV estimation is the better method for this situation. We report the OLS 
results for comparison nevertheless.  Most of our earlier findings still hold, and it is mainly 
the magnitude of the impact that changes. Household per capita expenditure increases by 8.2 
percent and overall total income goes up by 12.2 percent due to electrification.  Examining 
the components of income, it appears that having electricity improves both farm and non-
farm income.  In addition, the impact of household electrification on educational outcomes 
is quite positive, improving school completion rates as well as study time of both boys and 
girls.  So we can summarize our findings by saying that electrification has a significant 
positive impact on household’s socio-economic welfare, and various impact assessment 
techniques yield very similar results.          
     
6.   The growth and persistence of the benefits of household electricity  
The welfare impacts estimated so far report the average value of benefits accrued to all 
households that have electricity.  However, another important issue to investigate is how 
these benefits grow over time as the households add electricity appliances and increase the 
use of electricity.  It is quite likely that the benefits vary according to the length of time that a 
household has electricity. For example, a household with electricity service for 5 years would 
be expected to benefit more than the one having it for just a few months. Over time, 
households are expected to consume more electricity, diversify its use through accumulation 
of various appliances, and make more productive use of electricity.  
 To examine the relationship between the benefits of electricity and household’s 
exposure to electricity, households are grouped according to the length of time they have 
had electricity.  Form Table 10, a trend of increased use of electricity from prolonged 
exposure to electrification is obvious.  Because the rural electrification program in 
Bangladesh has been growing rapidly during the last five years, households that have grid for 
5 years or less are the most common, accounting for about 40 percent of all households with 
electricity. Also, as expected, the demand for electricity goes up with the length of time that 
                                                 
14 Here the null hypothesis is that both OLS and IV estimates are consistent, and the alternate hypothesis is 
that only the IV estimate is consistent. If the null hypothesis is true, OLS model should be used because it is 
more efficient. Otherwise, IV model should be used. 
 18 
 
 
 a household has had electricity.   On an average, there is roughly an increase of 5.0 kWh per 
month in electricity consumption for every 5 years that a household has electricity.   
The next question is, does this increase in the time lead to an increase in household 
benefits, and if so, how much?  To answer this question we examine the relationship 
between time of electricity adoption and income, expenditures and education.  The 
descriptive results in Table 11 verify that most welfare outcomes improve steadily with the 
duration of household’s electricity use. For example, households having electricity for more 
than 15 years have a 17 percent higher consumption expenditure and 43 percent higher 
income than those using electricity for 5 years or less. Given this trend, it is a good idea to 
explore a quantitative relationship between the length of a household’s electricity use and its 
welfare. At the same time, another question arises - does the electrification benefit keep 
going up indefinitely or slow down after some time? To examine these issues, we model a 
regression similar to equation (5) and replacing the household’s access to electricity, , with 
duration of electricity use (Dij) and also adding the squared term of the duration:   
ijE
 
ij
y
ijjij
y
ij
y
j
y
ij
yy
ij εημDλDδVγXβαY +++++++= 2    (7) 
 
We use the same instruments for duration and its squared term as we did in the 
model for electrification benefit equation. However, for simplicity, we limit the analysis to 
household income among all outcomes. As Table 12 shows, it is apparent that an additional 
year of exposure to electricity increases household’s income by 6.9 percent but squared 
duration shows a 0.4 percent decrease, implying a saturation in income growth due to 
electrification in the long run. Adjusting for the negative effect of the squared term, the net 
impact of duration on total income becomes less than 6.9 percent and is given by the 
expression (δ-2λ), which is 6.1 percent.  
 The results indicate that impact of electrification on household income slows down 
in the long run and eventually flattens out once benefits are fully realized. This is when the 
marginal impact of duration on income changes from positive to zero, and it can be 
calculated by differentiating income Y in equation (7) with respect to duration D and setting 
dD
dY
to 0. So the time at which return to household income diminishes to zero is given by the 
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 expression: λ
δ
Dc 2
= . From the results shown in Table 12, this duration is found to be 8.6 
years for benefits in income. This scenario is depicted in Figure 1, where outcome (Y) is 
plotted against duration (D). As the figure shows, the outcome increases as duration 
increases until a point is reached (point C on the curve) when outcome becomes flat. The 
tangent on the curve at this point is horizontal (parallel to X-axis) and 
dD
dY
turns from 
positive to zero.  
 
                    
Figure 1: Long-term relationship of household outcome and duration of electricity 
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7.  Are the benefits of electricity equitable?   
One of the major objectives of any major development projects such as rural electrification 
is to improve the livelihood of the poor. Access to electricity is highly dependent on 
household’s physical and human capital endowments (as shown in Table 4). Furthermore, 
rich people are expected to diversify electricity use with the adoption of a greater number of 
modern appliances and amenities. This raises the questions as to whether this unequal 
consumption of electricity and appliance ownerships results in unequal distribution of 
electrification benefits among the households that have electricity.  This is a critical issue for 
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 policy-makers, because critics may contend that rural electrification projects may not benefit 
the poor much, and money allocated to these projects, if allocated to alternate projects, 
might impart more benefits to poor households. In this section, we investigate whether 
electrification benefits of rich households are different from that of poor households.  
For this exercise, we consider household’s land asset as proxy for household’s 
economic welfare, because it is a common practice in rural Bangladesh besides the fact that 
household’s land does not vary in the short-term. To make a meaningful use of this variable, 
we create two dummy variables. The first dummy captures those households that have more 
than or equal to half an acre of land, and the second one captures those having less than half 
an acre of land. The choice of half and acre as the threshold value is guided by the fact that 
half an acre is often used as a cut-off point for poverty level of rural Bangladeshi 
households. We interact these dummy variables with household’s access to electricity and 
use those interactions, instead of original electrification variable, in the regression model 
similar to that used to estimate general impacts of electricity. The idea is to separate the 
electrification benefits for two groups of households. The resulting equation looks like this,  
 
ij
y
ijjijij
y
ijij
y
j
y
ij
yy
ij εημELχELλVγXβαY +++)*(+)*(+++= 21               (8) 
 
where L1 (household has at least half an acre of land) and L2 (household has less than half an 
acre of land) are the dummy variables from household’s landholding, and λ and χ are 
parameters to be estimated.15 The interaction parameters can be interpreted as the 
electrification benefits for land-rich and land-poor households respectively, and Table 13 
shows the results.   
From the results it is obvious that rich households benefit more than poor 
households from electrification. Electrification impacts on per capita expenditure for rich 
households (12.4 percent) are four times more than that for poor households (3.1 percent). 
Having electricity improves farm income a lot for rich households (almost 50 percent) 
without any significant impact on farm income of poor households. Obviously farmers with 
larg landholdings make more investments in their farm activities than do poor farmers – a 
fact which reaps greater returns for rich farmers once they have electricity. Electrification 
                                                 
15 We use a two-stage instrumental variable model (as before) by instrumenting the interaction variables.      
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 benefits on non-farm income do not vary much by landholding. Overall, only rich 
households accrue significant positive impacts in total income (21.2 percent).  
The trend is somewhat similar when it comes to educational outcomes. Schooling 
years for both boys and girls improve as a result of electrification, but such benefits for land-
rich households are slightly higher than that for land-poor households. For example, while 
boys’ schooling years for rich households go up by 0.16 grade due to electrification, that for 
poor households go up by 0.13 grade. As for children’s study hours, it is only land-rich 
households that post significant gains from electrification – 16.3 minutes and 20.5 minutes 
per day for boys and girls respectively, with no significant impacts for land-poor households.          
 What we can infer from this discussion is that physical capital makes a difference in 
the distribution of electrification benefits, and it matters more for rich households than for 
poor households. We have seen before that households with more physical assets are the 
ones to access electricity first when it is available in the community and they also consume 
more electricity than poor households. So it is not surprising that rich households would 
reap more electrification benefits than the poor households.                           
 
8.  Discussion and Conclusion 
The benefits of rural electrification have long been debated in the development literature.  
Although a large number of studies have found positive associations between rural 
electrification and development outcomes, there have been few studies that have tackled the 
issue of causality after taking care of endogeneity biases. This study is one of the few that 
have addressed the issue of correlation versus causation head on.  This has been made 
possible by employing robust econometric techniques that tackle counterfactual and 
endogeneity issues which often limit the quality of impact assessment exercises. However, in 
the end it must be admitted that all cross-sectional analysis have their shortcomings, and 
moreover, assessed impacts may be short-term. The patterns observed today may not hold in 
the future. Panel analysis gives a better opportunity for evaluation of longer term impacts of 
development projects.  REB in Bangladesh is now conducting a follow-up survey of the 
same households. Once that data is available for analysis, the findings of this study may be 
put to test.   
 According to the findings in this study, the rural electrification program has a strong 
and robust impact for both economic and educational outcomes.  For example, the gain in 
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 total income due to electrification can be as much as 30 percent.  Electricity also leads to a 
significant improvement in both completed schooling years and study time for children in 
rural households.  And, not only does household electrification result in income 
improvement, but this impact is sustained for as long as 8 years, after which the benefits 
level off.   
Last but certainly not least, the questions as to whether rural electrification benefits 
well-off households more than it does poor households has been analyzed.  For rich 
households that adopt electricity, the impacts are often higher than that for poor 
households.  Certainly, rural electrification programs that have a policy to reach as many 
households as possible without putting undue financial strain on electricity distribution 
companies have to deal with this issue.   
Let us now consider the benefits against the cost of connectivity.  The marginal 
distribution and connection costs incurred by the REB for each household range between 
US$600 to US$1,200 depending on the distance of communities from the medium or high 
voltages lines.  This cost covers the poles, lines, transformers, and other related costs 
necessary to reach rural households in communities without electricity.  Since most of the 
new equipments last about 30 years, the marginal connectivity cost is then between about 
US$1.50 to US$3.00 per household per month depending on the average distance from the 
grid.  On the other hand, the marginal cost associated with generation and transmission of 
electricity is assumed to be about US$0.03 per month per kWh, so the cost works out to be 
about $1.00 per month for a household consuming 30 kWh per month and about US$1.50 
for a household consuming 50 kWh per month.  Hence, the high cost scenario for serving a 
new rural household is about US$4.50 per month and this includes all marginal costs for 
bringing grid service to community that does not yet have electricity.  With the estimated 
average income gains of 12 percent per annum, the per capita income gain due to 
connectivity is about $12 per month.16  This means benefits exceed cost by more than 150 
percent.  This is indeed a huge benefit accrued to the society because of electrification.    
 Given the substantial income gains from electrification, programs that do not reach 
a good number of households in communities that receive electricity do not seem be 
exploiting their full development potential. For instance, a strict policy to only connect 
                                                 
16 This is based on an average household income of Tk.76,809 per year (Table 3), using the gains from IV 
estimates (Table 9), and assuming US $1 equals to Bangladesh Tk.65 (2005 conversion figure).  
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 households within a certain distance from the electricity lines may very well have less 
development benefits than those with a more expansive approach. This is not to diminish 
the importance of maintaining financially viable electricity distribution companies, but rather 
to emphasize that pricing and subsidy policies should be more inclusive. Certainly, the 
findings would support a strong effort to reduce connection costs for the poorest 
households while ensuring that they pay for the electricity they consume.   
In Bangladesh, the REB for the most part has been very successful in expanding 
electricity in rural areas all over the country through local electric cooperative distribution 
companies (Waddle 2007).  The electric cooperatives generally have low system losses, better 
billing and collection systems, and good theft prevention. Although there have been some 
problems with electricity outages, the electric cooperatives are generally trusted by their 
customers. The rural electrification programs are big, expensive, and institutionally complex, 
but they also appear to have rather large benefits when managed in a proper way. There are 
still many challenges to be overcome, but an expansion of electricity coverage that is 
equitable and institutionally and financially viable will have significant development benefits 
in rural Bangladesh and will balance growth in the country as a whole.   
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 Tables 
 
Table 1: Distribution of the sample  
User  Domestic Commercial Irrigation Industrial  Total 
Electricity users 9,793 1,549 1,325 1,343 14,063 
 
Electricity non-users 10,088 1,466 1,051 263 12,815 
 
Solar home system users 1,035 - - - 1,035 
 
Total Sample Size 20,916 3,015 2,376 1,606 27,913 
 
 
Table 2: Extent of electrification in rural Bangladesh  
Household electrification (%) Region Village 
electrification (%)
In villages with 
electricity 
In whole sample 
Dhaka 
 
51.6 55.1 29.7 
Chittagong 
 
57.0 68.2 40.3 
Khulna 
 
61.4 62.4 35.7 
Rajshahi 
 
54.1 56.2 31.8 
Barisal 
 
60.1 41.3 
 
23.1 
Sylhet 63.9 55.8 34.2 
 
All regions 
 
57.0 
 
58.2 
 
33.1 
Observations 13,829 7,071 20,900 
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 Table 3: Descriptive statistics of household outcomes by village electrification  
Outcome variables Villages with 
electricity  
Villages 
without 
electricity 
Difference 
Economic outcomes (N=20,903)    
Yearly per capita yearly expenditure 
(Tk.) 
11,438.2 
(5,236.9) 
11,394.4 
(6,375.1) 
43.8 
(0.54) 
Yearly farm income (Tk.) 24,541.1 
(43,907.8) 
32,708.2 
(49,087.9) 
-8,167.1 
(-12.65) 
Yearly non-farm income (Tk.) 58,244.5 
(56,551.4) 
52,843.3 
(105,073.1) 
5,401.2 
(4.77) 
Yearly total income (Tk.) 82,785.5 
(77,139.5) 
85,551.5 
(114,046.2) 
-2,765.9 
(-2.09) 
Education outcomes (age 5-18)    
Boys’ completed schooling years  
 
4.28 
(3.27) 
4.05 
(3.30) 
0.24 
(4.86) 
Girls’ completed schooling years  
  
4.51 
(3.28) 
4.04 
(3.28) 
0.57 
(10.93) 
Boys’ study time (minutes/day)  
  
127.5 
(126.3) 
124.1 
(125.9) 
3.4 
(1.79) 
Girls’ study time (hours/day)  
  
133.8 
(121.4) 
129.5 
(122.8) 
9.4 
(4.83) 
Observations NH=13,829, 
NM=11,806, 
NF=10,884 
NH=7,071 
NM=6,343, 
NF=5,633 
 
        Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations in second and third columns, and t-statistics in last column.  
                 NH=Number of households, NM=Number of boys, and NF=Number of girls. 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of household outcomes by household electrification  
Outcome variables Households without electricity 
 
Households 
with 
electricity  
 
In villages 
with 
electricity 
In villages 
without 
electricity 
All villages
Economic outcomes      
Yearly per capita expenditure (Tk.) 
 
12,543.5 
(5,437.1) 
9,988.3 
(4,514.9) 
11,394.4 
(6,375.1) 
10,863.8 
(5,827.6) 
Yearly farm income (Tk.) 30,051.0 
(51,113.5) 
16,869.1 
(29,557.7) 
 
32,708.2 
(49,087.9) 
27,086.6 
(43,838.3) 
Yearly non-farm income (Tk.) 68,449.2 
(61,464.3) 
44,035.6 
(45,214.5) 
52,843.3 
(105,073.1) 
49,717.3 
(88,683.7) 
Yearly total income (Tk.) 98,500.2 
(87,223.1) 
60,904.7 
(53,112.5) 
85,551.5 
(114,046.2) 
76,803.9 
(97,621.6) 
Education outcomes (age 5-18)     
Boys’ completed schooling years  
  
4.77 
(3.38) 
3.64 
(3.01) 
4.05 
(3.30) 
3.90 
(3.21) 
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 Girls’ completed schooling years  
  
5.06 
(3.38) 
3.99 
(3.16) 
4.04 
(3.28) 
4.02 
(3.24) 
Boys’ study time (minutes/day)  
  
141.8 
(130.4) 
108.4 
(117.9) 
124.1 
(125.9) 
118.6 
(123.4) 
Girls’ study time (minutes/day)  
  
154.1 
(129.5) 
117.9 
(114.6) 
129.5 
(122.8) 
125.4 
(117.0) 
Observations NH=9,782, 
NM=8,287, 
NF=7,704 
NH=4,047, 
NM=3,519, 
NF=3,180 
NH=7,071, 
NM=6,343, 
NF=5,633 
NH=11,118, 
NM=9,862, 
NF=8,813 
           Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. NH=Number of households, NM=Number of boys, and  
                    NF=Number of girls. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Benefits of household electrification (single difference) 
Outcome variables Comparison of electrified households with households 
without electricity in 
 In villages with 
electricity 
In villages without 
electricity 
All villages 
Economic outcomes     
Yearly per capita expenditure (Tk.) 
 
0.234 
(35.76) 
0.112 
(17.99) 
0.155 
(26.61) 
Yearly farm income (Tk.) 1.227 
(14.05) 
-0.733 
(-9.51) 
-0.037 
(-0.50) 
Yearly non-farm income (Tk.) 0.993 
(15.64) 
1.322 
(21.18) 
1.205 
(20.42) 
Yearly total income (Tk.) 0.433 
(45.44) 
0.177 
(18.89) 
0.268 
(30.92) 
Education outcomes (age 5-18)    
Boys’ completed schooling years  
  
1.134 
(18.91) 
0.725 
(12.97) 
0.867 
(16.66) 
Girls’ completed schooling years  
  
1.068 
(16.72) 
1.015 
(17.47) 
1.034 
(18.99) 
Boys’ study time (minutes/day)  
  
33.4 
(14.32) 
17.7 
(8.24) 
23.1 
(11.54) 
Girls’ study time (minutes/day)  
 
36.2 
(15.10) 
24.6 
(11.17) 
28.7 
(14.04) 
Observations NH=13,829, 
NM=11,806, 
NF=10,884 
NH=16,853, 
NM=14,630, 
NF=13,337 
NH=20,900, 
NM=18,149, 
NF=16,517 
           Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Income and expenditure variables are expressed in log  
                     form. NH=Number of households, NM=Number of boys, and NF=Number of girls. 
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Table 6: Summary statistics of electricity access and (major) explanatory variables 
used regression estimates (N=20,901) 
Variables Electricity 
users 
Nonusers Whole 
sample 
Household has electricity (1=Yes, 0=No) 1 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0.33 
(0.47) 
Age of household head (years)  44.68 
(12.16) 
42.65 
(11.56) 
43.32 
(11.80) 
Sex of household head (Male=1, female=0)  0.95 
(0.21) 
0.97 
(0.18) 
0.96 
(0.19) 
Education of household head (years) 6.35 
(4.49) 
4.54 
(4.46) 
5.14 
(4.55) 
Highest education among household males (years)  8.28 
(3.93) 
6.30 
(4.20) 
6.96 
(4.21) 
Highest education among households females (years)  6.82 
(3.57) 
5.19 
(3.76) 
5.73 
(3.77) 
Household land asset (decimals)  118.22 
(210.60) 
150.50 
(427.05) 
139.82 
(370.07) 
Household dwelling is brick-built (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.06 
(0.24) 
0.02 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
Household’s drinking water is from tube-well (1=Yes, 
0=No)   
0.97 
(0.16) 
0.97 
(0.17) 
0.97 
(0.17) 
Village price of firewood (Tk./kg) 1.77 
(0.56) 
1.66 
(0.55) 
1.70 
(0.55) 
Village price of kerosene (Tk./liter) 25.88 
(1.63) 
25.73 
(1.78) 
25.78 
(1.73) 
Village price of diesel (Tk./liter) 24.45 
(1.24) 
24.39 
(1.38) 
24.41 
(1.33) 
Proportion of village land that is irrigated  0.60 
(0.36) 
0.59 
(0.37) 
0.59 
(0.36) 
Observations 9,782 11,118 20,900 
         Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.   
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Probit estimates of household’s access to electricity  
Explanatory variables Estimates 
Sex of HH head (M=1, F=0) -0.153 
(-2.32) 
Age of HH head (years) 0.004 
(2.98) 
Education of HH head (years) 0.030 
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 (5.69) 
Highest education among HH males (years) 0.053 
(9.90) 
Highest education among HH females (years) 0.039 
(8.68) 
Log of HH landholding (decimals)  0.116 
(10.72) 
HH dwelling is brick-built (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.681 
(7.62) 
HH’s drinking water is from tube-well (1=Yes, 
0=No) 
-0.097 
(-1.16) 
Village price of firewood (Tk./kg) 0.122 
(3.80) 
Village price of kerosene (Tk./liter) -0.011 
(-1.15) 
Village price of diesel (Tk./liter) 0.008 
(0.37) 
ρ (rho)  -0.473 
(-26.69) 
Wald χ2(17) 1238.34 
p> χ2=0000 
Observations 20,900 
                Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.  Explanatory variables additionally include regional dummies.   
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 Table 8: Impacts of household electrification (PSM estimates) 
 PSM with kernel 
matching 
First alternate 
implementation 
of p-score    
Second alternate 
implementation 
of p-score    
Economic outcomes     
Yearly per capita expenditure (Tk.) 
 
0.154 
(9.29) 
0.060 
(7.54) 
0.092 
(16.74) 
Yearly farm income (Tk.) 0.729 
(5.52) 
-0.024 
(-0.31) 
0.241 
(3.93) 
Yearly non-farm income (Tk.) 0.903 
(7.37) 
0.564 
(6.66) 
0.737 
(12.71) 
Yearly total income (Tk.) 0.300 
(13.72) 
0.090 
(8.91) 
0.167 
(19.85) 
Education outcomes (age 5-18)    
Boys’ completed schooling years  
  
0.276 
(1.91) 
0.162 
(2.32) 
0.171 
(3.02) 
Girls’ completed schooling years  
  
0.226 
(1.603) 
0.355 
(5.04) 
0.117 
(2.12) 
Boys’ study time (minutes/day)  
  
18.2 
(4.94) 
4.9 
(1.65) 
10.4 
(4.95) 
Girls’ study time (minutes/day)  
  
17.0 
(5.71) 
11.7 
(3.85) 
12.9 
(5.94) 
Observations NH=12,123, 
NM=10,263, 
NF=9,547 
NH=20,900, 
NM=18,149, 
NF=16,517 
NH=20,900, 
NM=18,149, 
NF=16,517 
   Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Income and expenditure variables are expressed in log form.  
            NH=Number of households, NM=Number of boys, and NF=Number of girls. Regressions additionally include  
            household (head’s age, sex and education, maximum education of adult males and females, landholding,  
            sanitation, and so on) and village level variables (infrastructure and price). The first alternate implementation  
            of p-score uses an OLS regression to estimate electrification impacts where p-score replaces the original  
            treatment variable. The second alternate implementation of p-score uses a weighted OLS regression where  
            weight is calculated based on section 5.  
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Table 9: Impacts of household electrification (OLS and IV estimates)   
Outcome variables OLS estimates IV estimates Endogeneity test
(Durban-Wu-
Hausman χ2) 
Economic outcomes     
Yearly per capita expenditure (Tk.) 
 
0.095 
(15.95) 
0.082 
(7.24) 
χ2(1)=5.961 
Prob>χ2==0.015 
 
Yearly farm income (Tk.) 0.175 
(2.77) 
0.521 
(4.13) 
χ2(1)=0.054 
Prob>χ2==0.816 
 
Yearly non-farm income (Tk.) 0.615 
(10.15) 
0.229 
(1.97) 
χ2(1)=10.995 
Prob>χ2==0.001 
 
Yearly total income (Tk.) 0.163 
(20.65) 
0.122 
(8.09) 
χ2(1)=33.763 
Prob>χ2==0.000 
 
Education outcomes (age 5-18)    
Boys’ completed schooling years 0.180 
(5.36) 
0.092 
(1.47) 
χ2(1)=5.596 
Prob>χ2==0.037 
 
Girls’ completed schooling years 0.148 
(4.88) 
0.133 
(2.36) 
χ2(1)=0.056 
Prob>χ2==0.812 
 
Boys’ study time (minutes/day)  10.0 
(4.46) 
6.0 
(1.67) 
χ2(1)=4.347 
Prob>χ2==0.044 
 
Girls’ study time (minutes/day)  13.7 
(5.98) 
8.9 
(2.17) 
χ2(1)=0.58 
Prob>χ2==0.455 
 
Observations NH=20,900, 
NM=18,149, 
NF=16,517 
NH=20,900, 
NM=18,149, 
NF=16,517 
 
           Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Income and expenditure variables are expressed in log  
                     form. NH=Number of households, NM=Number of boys, and NF=Number of girls. Regressions 
                     additionally include household (head’s age, sex and education, maximum education of adult males and  
                     females, landholding, sanitation, and so on) and village level variables (infrastructure and price). 
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Table 10: Electricity use pattern by duration of electricity connection (N=9,782) 
Duration  Percentage 
of households  
Electricity use 
(kwh/month) 
5 years or less 39.6 35.5 
5 to 10 years 27.4 39.8 
10 to 15 years 17.3 47.2 
More than 15 years 15.7 50.4 
All electrified households 
(Average duration=8.8 years) 
100.0 41.0 
 
 
 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics of welfare indicators by duration electricity 
connection   
Outcome variables 5 years or 
less 
5 to 10 years 10 to 15 years More than 15 
years 
Economic outcomes      
Yearly per capita expenditure (Tk.) 
 
11,781.9 
(5,321.4) 
12,550.1 
(4,852.1) 
13,145.9 
(5,271.2) 
13,785.5 
(6,487.0) 
Yearly farm income (Tk.) 27,690.0 
(46,464.0) 
28,567.4 
(51,280.9) 
31,043.2 
(46,286.0) 
37,500.2 
(64,658.0) 
Yearly non-farm income (Tk.) 60,257.7 
(50,140.8) 
66,687.3 
(55,994.4) 
72,019.9 
(61,247.8) 
88,238.2 
(86,875.0) 
Yearly total income (Tk.) 87,947.7 
(76,004.3) 
95,254.7 
(75,732.2) 
103,063.1 
(79,864.4) 
125,738.4 
(125,781.8) 
Education outcomes (age 5-18)     
Boys’ completed schooling years  4.38 
(3.26) 
4.77 
(3.41) 
5.31 
(3.45) 
5.16 
(3.40) 
Girls’ completed schooling years  4.72 
(3.29) 
5.12 
(3.34) 
5.47 
(3.48) 
5.38 
(3.50) 
Boys’ study time (minutes/day)  132.3 
(128.3) 
140.1 
(130.5) 
156.6 
(133.5) 
152.6 
(130.0) 
Girls’ study time (minutes/day)  141.2 
(124.7) 
156.8 
(129.8) 
167.6 
(128.6) 
168.9 
(139.2) 
Observations NH=3,802, 
NM=3,280, 
NF=3,024 
NH=2,623, 
NM=2,224, 
NF=2,148 
NH=1,816, 
NM=1,515, 
NF=1,425 
NH=1,541, 
NM=1,515, 
NF=1,107 
             Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. NH=Number of households, NM=Number of boys, and   
                      NF=Number of girls. 
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Table 12: Impacts of household electrification duration on income    
Explanatory variables Estimates 
Duration of household’s electricity connection (years) 
 
0.069 
(5.32) 
Duration of household’s electricity connection squared 
 
-0.004 
(-4.36) 
Sex of HH head (M=1, F=0) -0.188 
(-7.29) 
Age of HH head (years) 0.007 
(17.66) 
Education of HH head (years) 0.012 
(4.19) 
Highest education among HH males (years) 0.031 
(23.60) 
Highest education among HH females (years) 0.021 
(15.47) 
Log of HH landholding (decimals)  0.110 
(33.27) 
HH dwelling is brick-built (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.334 
(11.08) 
HH’s drinking water is from tube-well (1=Yes, 0=No) -0.016 
(-0.58) 
Village price of firewood (Tk./kg) 0.195 
(19.65) 
Village price of kerosene (Tk./liter) 0.019 
(7.32) 
Village price of diesel (Tk./liter) 0.010 
(2.88) 
R2 0.346 
Observations 20,900 
                Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.  Explanatory variables additionally include regional dummies.   
 
 
 
 
 Table 13: Estimates of differential electrification benefits for land-rich and land-poor households    
Endowments variables Yearly per 
capita 
expenditure
(Tk.) 
Yearly 
farm 
income 
(Tk.) 
Yearly 
non-farm 
income 
(Tk.) 
Yearly 
total 
income 
(Tk.) 
Boys’ 
completed 
schooling 
years 
Girls’ 
completed 
schooling 
years 
Boys’ study 
time 
(minutes/ 
day) 
Girls’ study 
time 
(minutes/ 
day) 
Electrification of land-rich HHs 
(HH land asset is 0.5 acre or 
more*HH has access to grid)  
   
0.124 
(8.96) 
0.489 
(5.75) 
0.543 
(3.85) 
0.212 
(11.42) 
0.164 
(2.02) 
0.202 
(2.69) 
16.3 
(3.31) 
20.5 
(4.27) 
Electrification of land-poor 
HHs (HH land asset is less than 
0.5 acre*HH has access to grid)  
   
0.031 
(2.24) 
0.053 
(1.40) 
0.575 
(3.63) 
0.024 
(1.31) 
0.130 
(1.85) 
0.188 
(3.12) 
-2.7 
(-0.59) 
6.9 
(1.55) 
R2 0.236 0.419 0.152 0.407 0.694 0.784 0.250 0.292 
N 20,900 20,900 20,900 20,900 18,149 16,517 18,149 16,517 
           Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Income and expenditure variables are expressed in log form. Regressions additionally include household (head’s age, sex  
                    and education, maximum education of adult males and females, landholding, sanitation, and so on) and village level variables (infrastructure and price). 
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